THE Nation

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

VOLUME 155 NEW YORK · SATURDAY · SEPTEMBER 12, 1942 NUMBER 11

IN THIS ISSUE

THE SHAPE OF THINGS 201

EDITORIALS

No Man-Power Policy! 203

The President's Message 204

Franco Changes Guard *by Freda Kirchwey* 205

ARTICLES

The Geopolitical Front *by G. A. Borgese* 206

Greater Loyalty Hath No Man *by James Henle* 209

Short-Wave Artillery *by Stefan J. Rundt* 210

Hollywood Belligerent *by Ezra Goodman* 213

In the Wind 214

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

C. B. S.—Berlin the Third *by Ralph Bates* 215

The Progressive Psyche *by Lionel Trilling* 215

Bon Voyage, S. V. B. *by Frank Jones* 217

Three German Poets *by Rolfe Humphries* 218

Records *by B. H. Haggin* 219

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS 220

Editor and Publisher
FREDA KIRCHWEY

Managing Editor ROBERT BENDINER
Washington Editor I. F. STONE
Literary Editor MARGARET MARSHALL

Associate Editors
KEITH HUTCHISON MAXWELL S. STEWART

Assistant Editor RICHARD H. ROVERE
Music Critic B. H. HAGGIN
Drama Critic JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

Board of Contributing Editors
NORMAN ANGELL • JONATHAN DANIELS • LOUIS FISCHER
REINHOLD NIEBUHR • J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

Business Manager HUGO VAN ARX
Advertising Manager MARY HOWARD ELLISON

Published weekly and copyright, 1942, in the U. S. A. by The Nation, Inc., 55 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter, December 13, 1879, at the Post Office of New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879. Washington Editorial Bureau: 856 National Press Building.

The Shape of Things

NAZI SOURCES NOW DESCRIBE ROMMEL'S attempted advance in Egypt as a mere "reconnaissance in force," but the nature of the attack and the fact that the whole *Afrika Korps* was thrown against the British left wing suggest that a full-fledged offensive had been planned. In any case Rommel is now back where he started from, minus a considerable number of troops and with a nasty dent in his armor. The new British command in Egypt has come through its first test with honors, but it remains to be seen whether it can turn from the defensive to the offensive and inflict a smashing defeat on the Axis forces in North Africa before new supplies reach them. Until Rommel's panzer units are mauled much more thoroughly than they have been in the past week the optimism voiced by Wendell Willkie at Cairo must unfortunately be considered premature. The fighting on the Alamein front demonstrated once again the vital importance of air superiority, and this time it was definitely on our side. The German tanks, after making their way to some depth through the British mine fields, were stalled by our armor and artillery and were then subjected to severe handling by the air force. Constant effective attacks were also made on the enemy supply lines all the way from the front back to Tobruk and beyond, and a heavy toll was taken of Axis shipping in the Mediterranean.

*

THE DEFENDERS OF STALINGRAD DESERVE, perhaps, part of the credit for the Axis setback in Egypt, for according to some reports German aircraft were diverted to that front from Africa. Certainly the German High Command is throwing everything it has into the effort to capture the great city on the Volga. But although some days ago Berlin was claiming that all would be over in twenty-four hours, the prize still eludes the Nazi grasp. Pouring out of the factories, the workers of Stalingrad have marched to join the Red Army in a desperate effort to turn back the enemy. Every recent German gain has been followed by a savage counter-thrust, but according to latest dispatches, a dangerous wedge has been driven into the Soviet lines directly west of the city. Stalingrad's defenders, however, are determined to make it a "red Verdun," and Hitler has not yet finished paying

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the price of its conquest. In the direction of the Grosny oil fields the German drive also seems to have been held up, but there is reason to fear that the Germans may have succeeded in taking Novorossiisk—the last first-class Soviet naval base on the Black Sea. It is encouraging that despite their preoccupations with defense the Russians have been able to make a number of long-distance raids on eastern Germany. It is to this region that the Nazis have been attempting to remove their industries to take them beyond the present range of the R. A. F. These Soviet bombing attacks appear to have been carried out with remarkably few losses, which suggests that German air defenses have been concentrated in the west. The synchronization of aerial attacks from both directions is an important development, and we hope before long to hear of Russian, British, and American airmen joining hands, figuratively speaking, over Berlin.

✶

THE SHAKE-UP IN THE JAPANESE CABINET involving the resignation of Foreign Minister Tojo and of several of his subordinates has been widely interpreted as forecasting an imminent attack on the Soviet Union. Such an interpretation is fully justified by past Japanese political behavior. An even more drastic shake-up, it will be recalled, preceded Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Although Tojo could scarcely be considered a friend of the Soviet Union, he was identified with the negotiations that led to the signing of the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact in the spring of 1941. It is quite conceivable, therefore, that his resignation signifies an intention to violate that pact. On the other hand, the Japanese government may have wished to give just such an impression in order to conceal its plans for an attack elsewhere. There seems to be little doubt that the Japanese have a surprise of some sort up their capacious kimono sleeves, and the extent of the recent withdrawals from China suggests that it will be a major undertaking. Since weather conditions will shortly become unfavorable for an attack on Siberia, a drive against a weak and divided India appears more probable.

✶

THE REACTIONS OF THE SENATE FINANCE Committee to the Treasury's spending-tax plan were so generally negative that it appears likely to be still-born. This will be unfortunate if as a result attention is diverted from direct measures to curb spendable income and shifted back to the sales tax. But it must be admitted that the Treasury plan is a good deal better in intention than in construction. Its great virtues are that, unlike the sales tax, it avoids the erosion of incomes on the subsistence level and retains the progressive principles of the income tax. Its outstanding fault is its complication, which would place a grievous burden of additional paper work on the citizen and would make an adequate check by the Internal Revenue Department an almost insuperable task. Another major objection to the plan is the fact that it taxes spending after instead of before the event, which weakens it as an implement for curbing inflation. We agree with Mr. Morgenthau that fiscal measures to reduce the pressure of expanding incomes on a contracting supply of goods are due and overdue. But the Weinstein scheme, summarized by Keith Hutchison in *The Nation* of July 11, seems to us to be both simpler and more flexible than the Treasury plan. Mr. Weinstein, who gives a full account of his proposals in the September issue of *Taxes,* suggests that certain categories of goods and services shall require the presentation of purchase coupons, which, after the exhaustion of a specified exempt amount during a fixed period, will be obtainable at a progressively increasing premium *payable in advance.* This plan would clip spending power prior to its actual exercise, lend itself to decentralized administration, and avoid the public and private accountancy problems created by the Treasury spending tax.

✶

"WE ARE SO AFRAID OF WRONGING OTHERS that in doubtful cases we prefer to wrong ourselves." The speaker is Joseph Goebbels; the "we" refers to the German people. The sentence is from an article recently published in a Nazi weekly in which Dr. Goebbels told his countrymen that they were too unbiased toward their enemies. On the contrary, he said, they should acquire a "sound national ego" which would make them turn upon the British the hatred they deserve "because they wish to keep us prisoners in the narrowness of our national existence. . . ." "One cannot imagine what our people would do to a government that would tell us as many lies as Mr. Churchill tells the British people [it is still Goebbels speaking]. Nevertheless, there are still people among us who are prone to accept this as a kind of political style." It is difficult to stop quoting, but we have only enough space left to decode the Goebbels sermon. Its text is, Hate thy neighbor as myself. Its key sentence runs, "We do not want to experience another such catastrophe as in 1918." Obviously the Germans have been listening to British and American broadcasts. Obviously they are alarmed at the prospect of defeat; but because they are sick to death of war, they are pinning their slim hopes for the future on the miracle of a decent peace. Nazi propaganda on the home front must be more than ever directed toward making the German people fear the future peace more than they hate the present war.

✶

AMONG THE AMERICANS ON THE GRIPSHOLM none is more deserving of honor from his fellow-countrymen than J. B. Powell, for many years editor of the militantly anti-Japanese *China Weekly Review.* Powell knew no fear and pulled no punches. He fought

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against all who obstructed progress, whether they were British diehards, American super-nationalists, or Japanese militarists. No American in the Far East has been a more consistent friend of the Chinese. In recent years he has repeatedly risked his life in an effort to arouse the United States against the Japanese menace. As a result several attempts were made to assassinate him. On one occasion a Japanese threw a hand grenade at him; fortunately, it failed to explode. He was arrested on December 9 and thrown into prison. After months on starvation rations he contracted pellagra; his feet were frozen and gangrene set in, causing him to lose all his toes. His weight fell from a normal 160 to 75 pounds. If Powell were in the army, he would be given a D. S. O. for bravery and cared for at government expense. But although his exploits as a civilian are no less worthy of honor, his return has scarcely been noticed in the press. Obviously, there should be some public recognition of his years of foreign service. Preferably, it should come from the government. If this is impossible, why should he not receive a Pulitzer prize for his outstanding contribution to American journalism abroad?

No Man-Power Policy!

THE recent conflicting statements on the draft issued by Representative May of the House Military Affairs Committee and Brigadier General Hershey illustrate the confusion which still surrounds our national man-power policy. The question of whether we should draft eighteen- and nineteen-year-old youths or married men with families is, of course, but a minor aspect of the general problem of making the most efficient use of our rapidly dwindling supply of man-power. Surveys made recently in several war-production centers indicate that many industries are already beginning to feel pinched for workers as a result of stepped-up inductions into the army. Five large airplane plants in Southern California, for example, are reported to be losing 7,000 workers a month to the services. Serious labor shortages are expected to become general by the end of the year if the present rate of inductions is continued. And according to General Hershey, an even greater expansion in the armed forces is planned for next year. By the end of 1942 the army is expected to number some 4,500,000 men and the navy possibly 750,000. Some observers are predicting a combined army-navy strength of 11,000,000 by the end of 1943. A more conservative estimate is 9,000,000.

Since most of the men who will be called into service will come from higher age groups than heretofore, it is obvious that the drain on war industries will be severe. The situation is made worse by the fact that the plants themselves will demand a huge number of additional workers in the coming year. At present about 12,500,000 persons are employed in war industries. The number is expected to rise to 17,500,000 by the end of this year and to 20,000,000 by the end of 1943.

In theory, the responsibility for properly balancing military and production needs and making certain that the man-power demands of the war industries are met with a minimum of disturbance rests with the War Manpower Board. But although the board has now been functioning for about five months, there is little evidence that these basic questions of policy have even been tackled. On the contrary, several government departments are still pursuing independent and sharply conflicting policies. It is difficult to believe, for example, that a decision to raise an army and navy of 11,000,000 men in 1943 was taken after a careful survey of the amount of production needed to supply not only this force but the men already under arms in England, Russia, and China. The evidence suggests rather that the army and navy determined on this figure without considering the larger questions of United Nations strategy, and that the WPB has pursued an independent course in handing out contracts regardless of the man-power potentialities of the areas concerned. Instead of serving as an over-all planning agency, the War Manpower Board appears to have been occupied with technical problems, such as preventing labor piracy and improving the efficiency of the United States Employment Service.

Despite the acute shortage of labor in certain areas, no plan has yet been worked out for using the selective-service machinery for distributing workers where they are most needed for the war effort. No effective use has been made of the information collected through the occupational questionnaires sent to selective-service registrants. Although it is apparent that a large proportion of the 7,500,000 additional workers that will be needed in the war industries before the end of 1943—not counting replacements for men who are drafted—must be women, little is being done in preparation. British experience has shown that women are fully capable of replacing men in most jobs but that a great many things must be done before they can be utilized. Special training courses must be set up. Day nurseries must be established in connection with the factories to care for younger children. Rearrangements of shifts are necessary to provide for part-time work. Special attention has to be given to personnel work and the improvement of working conditions in order to reduce excessive turnover and absenteeism. After much blundering and lost production, Britain has made most of these adjustments. We hope that the women's policy committee just appointed by Mr. McNutt will seize its opportunity to draft a program which will save us from similar blunders.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The President's Message

WE HOPE Congress will not allow any feeling of hurt pride to stand in the way of immediate legislation making possible the stabilization of all prices as requested by the President. In more normal times it might rightly object to the ultimative quality of Mr. Roosevelt's message, but now that we are fighting "the toughest war in history" there is no more justification for *amour propre* as usual than there is for politics or business as usual. The unprecedented nature of the President's message is warranted by the urgent need for action if the price situation is not to get entirely out of hand. Controlled prices have held steady for the past five months, but farm prices have been rising at the rate of 1½ per cent a month—a leak in the ceiling which is endangering the whole structure.

The proposals put forward by the President are by no means unfair to the farmer. A ceiling on farm prices equivalent to 100 per cent of parity or recent prices, whichever is the higher, should give him both his fair share of purchasing power and an incentive to increased production of commodities for which there is an especially large demand. Moreover, the President is also proposing to put a floor under farm prices with a view to protecting agriculture from any sudden slump either during or after the war.

If the cost of living can be held at its present level, labor should not object to stabilized wages. The President did not indicate exactly what steps he proposed to take to this end, but there is reason to suppose he plans to generalize the WLB's "Little Steel" formula, which seeks to maintain the purchasing power of wages at their January 1, 1941, level. Stabilization of pre-war incomes does not and cannot mean the maintenance of pre-war standards of living, let alone standards of comfort, as the President might have emphasized even more strongly. All of us, except those on a bare subsistence basis, must expect to contract our accustomed way of life severely. Up to now most of us, apart from families whose men have gone into the services, have had to accept only minor sacrifices. But if inflation is to be headed off, stabilization of wages and prices is not enough. Drastic curtailment of individual spending power by means of taxation and compulsory saving is an urgent necessity.

Here again Congress has been laggard in its responsibilities, and it is still wrangling over a tax bill which ought to have been completed months ago. Further, it seems more interested in easing the burdens of various interests than in jacking up taxes to an extent commensurate with the Treasury's requirements. The President

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has also asked for action on this front and has again urged that income-tax rates be adjusted to insure that no individual has a net income, after taxes, exceeding $25,000. We anticipate a new howl of anguish from the well-to-do and a spate of arguments to prove that the war cannot be financed by soaking the rich. This is perfectly true, but it is also true that we cannot expect to take one-third or more of the income of persons in the lower brackets—as we must—while leaving those in the upper brackets with the means, after paying taxes, to maintain a high standard of luxury.

Franco Changes Guard

By FREDA KIRCHWEY

IT IS easy to understand why Washington officials—and not only the congenital appeasers—are watching developments in Spain with anxious hope. Much is at stake. As we said last week, the President's announcement of a plan to restore Spain's battered cultural monuments and to boom its tourist trade after the war was no mere exercise in benevolence; so bald an overture to Franco proclaimed a major political maneuver. Coming immediately after it, the Spanish Cabinet upset has produced almost the effect of a diplomatic coup, and many commentators have allowed themselves the risky satisfaction of counting up the still unhatched chickens of appeasement.

This is a natural impulse. Ahead lie months of dark uncertainty. While the Russians hold nine-tenths of Hitler's armed force locked in desperate conflict in the Caucasus and the Volga valley, many observers see the Allied center of gravity moving toward North Africa and the Middle East. If this theater is to provide the only major second front, if a great Allied drive is in the making there, then our relation with Spain will become more and more critical. Spanish Morocco borders French North African territory on the west; and it would be of crucial importance to Allied forces operating against Rommel and the Italians from that direction to be able to count on a friendly neutral across the straits from Gibraltar.

And so it is easy to sympathize with the hopes of those who read into the Spanish Cabinet shuffle a move away from the Axis. Such a shift would go far toward offsetting the nasty political effects of appeasement. But unfortunately nothing that has happened offers any valid excuse for castle-building. If the prospect of a successful North African campaign depends on such risky speculations as the purchase of Franco's favors, we view the coming months with added apprehension.

What are the facts?

It is true of course that relations between the Phalanx and the army, always strained, have lately been growing worse, and that this situation precipitated the Cabinet crisis. But the same thing has happened at least twice before. As early as 1939 Franco was forced to resolve a similar conflict. Then as now he patched up the quarrel by getting rid of a few troublesome individuals on both sides and installing men whom he could trust.. Then as now the shift was widely interpreted as a defeat for the pro-Axis group. Now as then the interpretation is based on superficial appearances rather than underlying facts.

From the start the Phalanx has been trying to establish its power in the army, as did the Brown Shirts in Germany and the Black Shirts in Italy. About three months ago the walls of Madrid were plastered one night with posters announcing that the Phalanx and the army were bound in an indissoluble brotherhood and together were masters of Spain. Next day General Varela, the Minister of War, stepped out of his car before one of the posters and tore it down. That night the posters reappeared. This time Varela ordered army officers to remove them; they did it, all but precipitating an open conflict in the process. The situation grew more tense until, at a recent ceremony at Bilbao attended by the War Minister, a bomb was thrown; it was charged that the attack was a Phalanx attempt on Varela's life.

Obviously, Franco had to act. Such incidents endangered the regime itself. General Varela not only was Minister of War. He is the only officer ever to have been decorated twice with the Cruz San Fernando, Spain's highest military honor. His prestige is enormous in the army, and he is hated in equal measure by the Phalanx, which has looked upon him as a chief instrument in the effort to restore the throne. Franco moved with decision; he took the most striking step possible, tossing his own brother-in-law, the Foreign Minister and head of the Phalanx, to the army. And then in a dramatic countermove he threw Varela himself to the Phalanx.

The balance in the government has not been visibly changed. Jordana, the new Foreign Minister, is, it is true, a monarchist. But a monarchist is not necessarily and by definition a partisan of the democracies. Jordana was Franco's Foreign Minister all through the rebellion and in that role helped establish Hitler and Mussolini as the real dictators of Spain. The new Minister of the Interior, Blas Gomez Perez, and the new Minister without Portfolio, Manuel Mora Figueroa, are both Phalangists, "old" Phalangists whose adherence to the party and to fascism long antedated the Spanish war. Perez has already announced a policy of "repression with unswerving energy of all provocation or acts of sabotage."

The Phalangist organ *Arriba* described the Cabinet shake-up as merely a "change of guard." This much was quoted in the American press, but the dispatches omitted *Arriba's* comment on attempts to find other political meanings in the incident. "The speculations of a gang of foreigners," it said, "supported by an internal gang of Free Masons and intriguers, are well known to us. We

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have had a large experience of their interpretations, and as in other cases in the past we merely take note of them now." And it went on to proclaim the permanent, unchanging, and silently heroic nature of the Franco government's policy—foreign as well as domestic.

One need not take *Arriba's* word as gospel, but at least it represents the official Phalangist position: nothing has happened, and those who expect a change are fooling themselves as they have done before.

I hope our own government is not fooling itself. Whatever Spain's internal divisions, a majority of the men in power, fascist or monarchist, want and expect an Axis victory. They have bet their lives on it. And even if they were disposed to risk their lives by helping defeat the Axis, Hitler has ways to discourage them. Germany's two leading diplomats are von Papen and von Stohrer. The first is in Ankara, the second in Madrid. Von Stohrer has a major job to do: he has to prevent the final decomposition of the Franco regime. To this end he must support both the army and the Phalanx and help keep the conflict between them within bounds. And he has at his disposal the persuasive power of a force of technicians and police and actual military elements which have been spread throughout Franco's army; not to mention five or six divisions of the German army on Spain's border. Can Ambassador Hayes match that? I'm afraid that he could varnish all the paintings in the Prado without visibly modifying the pro-Axis policy of Franco.

The Nation has bitterly opposed the appeasement of Franco, not only because it is a betrayal of the Spanish people and of our own democratic pretensions, but because it has proved futile. Never for a moment has the Spanish regime wavered from its pro-Axis position or wriggled out from under Axis control. The only dependable pro-Ally force in Spain is the Spanish people—an element unaccountably ignored in Washington and London. Just as Hitler uses the fears and reactionary interests of Spain's ruling groups to cinch his control on the country, so we should use the powerful democratic impulses of the people to break that control. Only when our foreign policy is based on the realities of the political struggle will it become either strong or successful.

The Geopolitical Front

BY G. A. BORGESE

HIGH-SCHOOL graduates who had some Latin may remember a prelude to geopolitics in the opening sentences of Julius Caesar's "Gallic Wars," with the clear-cut outline of the region implying concepts of politics and strategy which had guided the conqueror and now illumine the historian. But the Italians, unsurpassed in their role of forgotten forerunners, would claim geopolitical primacy in the description of their peninsula as designed by Dante and Petrarch and colored by later writers—a country unique, bastioned against foreign offense by the Alps and the sea, prosperously articulated along the backbone of its inner mountains, and perhaps called to world supremacy by its location at the center of the world. Indeed, discussions of the climatic and geographic prerequisites best fitted to enable a commonwealth to survive in freedom or expand in power have been commonplace among the political observers of all ages; and there is small wonder in chancing on another sample of geopolitical preview in "Richard II," where John of Gaunt extols the natural conditions which singled out his England for the manifest destiny of splendid isolation:

> This fortress built by Nature for herself
> against infection and the hand of war,
> this happy breed of men, this little world,
> this precious stone set in the silver sea. . . .

However, we shall be content with the handier genealogy provided by Strausz-Hupé.* Its farthest branches do not reach beyond the 1820's, when the first German pathfinders of geopolitics proper walked heavily under the influence of President Monroe's hemispheric postulate. But it was for a Britisher, Sir Halford Mackinder, one-time director of the London School of Economics, to lay much later the systematic foundations of the new science. This he did at first in a short lecture, "The Geographical Pivot of History," delivered before the Royal Geographical Society and published in 1904; whence the doctrine, transplanted and adapted to Germany by Major General Professor Doctor Karl Haushofer and cultivated by a numberless aggregation of disciples, grew to its present vigor and renown. It is now the science of the day, with many also in America daily seeing the light. Haushofer, the septuagenarian in Munich, omitted until a short while ago from current encyclopedias and dictionaries, is a power behind Hitler's throne, the father of the myth of *Lebensraum*, spiritual fuel for the Nazi divisions rolling eastward.

Puzzled reviewers of Strausz-Hupé's excellent book have been asking what in geopolitics is science and what is hoax. The answer becomes obvious as soon as the

*Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power. By Robert Strausz-Hupé. G. P. Putnam's Sons. $2.75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enduring elements of the problem are dissociated from its transitory projections on the screen of propaganda. That the nature of the earth and the fortunes of the human beings who inhabit it are related is so true as to sound like a truism—which nobody was naive enough to copyright as his own invention; and it is a legitimate assignment for science to investigate the coordinations of territory and history. Historiography in the last century and ours has advanced by sudden strides; emphasis, long overdue on a neglected component of history, has carried with it a passionate overemphasis, until a reasonable level is reached between the defects of ignorance and the excesses of fad. This is valid for the Marxian stress, and overstress, on the economic factor of history; it is valid for the Freudian exploration of sex; and the measure could be almost automatically applied to geopolitics as well. It is quite possible that sufficient thought had not been given in past ages to geography as the scaffolding of history; hence it is understandable that the tutor and promoter of an adolescent science striving to interpret history and politics in the frame of geography should be driven to fits of inconsiderate fervor. This might be the case even if the tutor and promoter were other than a Nazi general.

Being what he is, Haushofer blatantly makes a point of converting his science into an implement for racial world conquest. All static blueprints of lands and peoples—such as Petrarch's or Shakespeare's—each allowing for the existence of others, are thrown off with derision, and every frontier is a battlefield. Thus the first term of the binomial falls out, and geopolitics shrinks to crude politics—or hoax. Its disqualification as a science, all make-up notwithstanding, is compellingly evident in the master's posture—as self-assured as it is indecent—between the two stools of materialistic determinism and mystic voluntarism. The first and basic assumption is that the ground, or territory, in its objective structure and explicit opportunities, determines to an enormous extent the destiny of man. But together with this we are taught that man, or at least the German, is the master of destiny, and that the earth is his for the asking if he asks in earnest. In fine, the direction prescribed to the supra-romantic omnipotence of the German will circuitously points anew to the materialistic determinism which we thought we had left behind. There is on this earth a certain land, contained within certain degrees of latitude and longitude, that is the land of destiny. The keys of world empire lie there—and nowhere else. Who gets that land gets the world. Its name—unheard by most laymen before Strausz-Hupé's book—is Heartland.

Here again we are confronted with a double-faced theory, as self-evident generically as it is specifically open to discussion. It is self-evident that in the vicissitudes of any battle there is a hill, or a river, or a trench which we may dub, *ex post facto,* the hill or the river or the trench of decision. It is equally apparent that in most phases of the struggle for power through the centuries there has been a province or region whose control or loss affected the outcome of that whole phase of the struggle. But the Heartland of Cyrus was in one place, and the Heartland of Napoleon was somewhere else. The Heartland of the German emperors in the Middle Ages was northern Italy; the Heartland of the Spanish kings a few centuries later may have been the Netherlands. The problem as it emerges from the speculations of Haushofer and of his precursors and followers is whether there really exists *in the present circumstances* somewhere on the map one definite zone out of which the opportunity for world control should flow as a stream from its fountainhead—and if there is, whether ahead of telltale events we can reasonably agree on the whereabouts *today* of that shrine of power.

Strausz-Hupé, if I understand him correctly, remains noncommittal. One of his chapters is entitled Heartland and Hokum. It is a merit of his book that the scholarly neatness of the information and the quiet transparency of the style are not sacrificed to impulsive indorsements or to the hurry of competitive results. It is probable, however, that stripped of pseudo-scientific pomp and translated into the factual terms of the present situation, much of the geopolitical theory acquires validity.

The shrine of power, as envisioned by geopolitics, is capacious. First Mackinder identified it as the huge central land mass of Eurasia.* Haushofer followed suit. This Heartland—broadly heart-shaped, with the tip northeastward—includes but sections of European Russia west of the Urals; neither does it comprise the Maritime Provinces of Siberia; it stretches from the Caucasus to the Lena and beyond; the Himalayas and the other mountain ranges border it to the south, the Icy Ocean to the north. Self-sufficient in commodities and military resources, this empire atop the kingdoms of the earth stands secure from sea-borne attacks; while as for air power—whose rise casts so large a shadow on the picture of present and future—one can reasonably presume that if London and Malta have weathered those storms, Tashkent and Irkutsk might survive bigger storms equally well. It is fair to assume that the terrific display of air forces—whose alleged ultimate decisiveness perhaps intoxicates unruly imaginations no less damagingly than the inherited rules of sea power made drowsy many a military academy—has not shaken Mackinder's views. "Who rules Eastern Europe," he wrote,

*A first-hand outline of the Heartland has become available in Mackinder's "Democratic Ideals and Reality" (Henry Holt), reprinted from the first edition of 1919. The book, however, does not contain the lecture of 1904, which was basic for Haushofer as it is for Strausz-Hupé, and consists largely of an attempt to translate a great discovery into the mediocre terms of the "balance of power."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island [that is, the totality of Europe, Asia, and Africa]. Who commands the World Island rules the world." At any rate we know for sure that Haushofer has not changed his mind. Undisturbed by the rumbling air, he contends more firmly than ever that the Heartland is the roof of the world. From its vast height the architecture of the universe can be mastered.

Mackinder was first moved by the British worry over the chances for world domination by Russia or by a Russo-German alliance operating from the Heartland. He did not think that the fragmentary crescent of British sea power along the margins of the World Island could long withstand the pressure from the central land mass of Eurasia. He did not go so far as to propose, if possible, the conquest of the Heartland by the British Empire. It was for Haushofer to carry the theory straight to its conclusion. If the Heartland is the world, let the Germans have it. Two roads lay hypothetically open: a German-Russian agreement, with Russian administration of the Heartland under German control; or outright conquest, with thorough annexation or without it, but in either case with visible vassalage of whatever should remain of Russia to German overlordship. The first road was tried with the pact of August 23, 1939. It reached a dead end in Russia's recalcitrance. The second is being tried in the present campaign.

The military gist of the Mackinder-Haushofer doctrine is that it is land power that will finally prevail. An illustration from the past will largely confirm, while partially qualifying, this view. Rome learned from Carthage the lesson of sea power. Hannibal in turn learned from Rome the lesson of land power. But he did not march from Cannae to Rome. Scipio, wielding both sea and land power, won the war. The analogies with the present situation need not be elaborated; they visibly apply to all three sides of the military triangle—sea, air, and land. It is credible, however, that land power will emerge at last as the hypotenuse of the changing triangle. Land power is infantry, motorized or not. Infantry is by definition the common people. It is the passion and the belief of the common people that will win the war.

Although the geopoliticians of the Mackinder-Haushofer school are strict politicians and strategists, with a less deep-seated interest in social and ideological issues, their disclosure of the Heartland has none the less at the present moment stupendous implications of a social and ideological nature. The attic on the roof of the world seems roomy enough to harbor, besides the keys to strategic world control, other implements of miscellaneous significance. One among them may be the melting-pot, or witch caldron, for the revitalization of the crossbreed that was still-born in 1939 and bore the name of communazism. Another might be the crucible for the blending of universal socialism with universal democracy. The Heartland might develop into an infernal machine for world destruction or into a laboratory for world redemption and reform.

Says Strausz-Hupé: "Haushofer and his disciples started from the fair assumption that the strategic implications of the Heartland would be overlooked by the Western powers." It was a fair assumption indeed. "They started from the much less plausible premise that these strategic implications would remain hidden from the very power which controlled the Heartland." How much less plausible this premise was we are unable to state. Had the Russians been fully awake to the strategic implications of the Heartland, they probably would have been less insistent in asking for a second front in Western Europe and most resolute in wanting—together with America and China, and against both Germany and Japan—the other front, the global front. The focus of the global front is in Siberia.

We have been instructed of late on the "valor of ignorance." If the global plan as published in *The Nation* of April 11 (A. E. F. to Siberia!) had been prompted by a substantial knowledge of the Mackinder-Haushofer geopolitics, its authority would not soar far above that of a deductive application. Here is, however, the frank avowal that the very name of Heartland lay deep at that time in our Sea of the Unknown. The valor of ignorance in the present case is in the singular circumstances that made Siberia the meeting place between the lead-footed advance of a ponderous "science" and the quick flight of inspirational strategy.

The argument from the half-factual and half-imaginative view describing the history of civilization as a progress from the southeast to the northwest—and therefore pointing to the Arctic shore of Asia as the terminus of the march which started, let us suppose, from Mesopotamia—is not weighty enough to support the thesis. But it is relevant to refer again to the knowledge, now rising at last to popular favor, that this is a total war, a global war—as no other war ever was—whose stake is the control of the globe either by the system embodied in the Axis or by the system maturing in the United Nations. Hence it is plausible to assume the existence of one platform of power, or core of strategy, the control of which will decide this fight. Faust asked: How shall I grasp thee, infinite nature? Our question is: Where shall we grasp this slippery earth-ball?

In the meantime the German armies are crowding the Russians toward the outskirts of the Heartland, and Japan, at the opposite end, quicker-witted than we, has grasped with fog-gloved hands—and bends against ourselves—the point of the Aleutian scimitar which we should have swung at her. The language of the current map is plainer than the cerebrations of geopolitical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

science. It also is stronger than the counsels of intuitive strategy. And perhaps the price we shall pay for the combined sluggishness of the Western and of the Russian mind, and for the conflict, latent or open, between their war aims, will be a staggering one, but still it is conceivable that a coming phase will be a race from west and east to the northern accesses, and that in spite of delays and detours the field of final decision will be in Asia, with defeat or victory hanging on whether the Heartland will be in German hands—or Russian hands with German chains—or whether it will remain to Russia with the help and presence of the United States and the United Nations.

It was a Roman dictum that *fas est et ab hoste doceri* —it is right to be taught even by the enemy. Haushofer paraphrased it in the tenet that "military understanding passes from the victor to the defeated." We have been defeated enough. The time for learning has come.

Greater Loyalty Hath No Man

BY JAMES HENLE

WHEN the social scientists of a succeeding age begin their examination of the attitudes and the *mores* of the first half of the twentieth century, they are certain to be impressed—perhaps astonished—by the loyalty that the corporation has been able to inspire in its more highly remunerated servants. This loyalty, it must be observed, does not prevent an occasional executive vice-president or purchasing agent from accepting a little polite—and personal—baksheesh when dealing with the smaller fry swept within the corporate orbit, but it does mean that on all larger, vital issues he is devoutly faithful to his trust. Reading the correspondence of business officials, as exposed by three decades of Congressional and legislative inquiries, one is immediately struck by the spectacle of men of some sense of honor willing, even eager, to perform for their stockholders acts they never could be induced to undertake for mere personal gain. One searches the record in vain for another case like that of John B. Sheridan, propagandist for the National Electric Light Association, who in letters made public by the Federal Trade Commission in the late twenties disclosed a mounting sense of shame at the tasks his job imposed on him. Mr. Sheridan, whose sins affected only utility rates and not our national safety, apparently decided that the only proper atonement was self-destruction.

But such a case is not only atypical; it is unique. At the other extreme we may cite the $4,500 employee in the auditing department of a railroad. For years this road had paid dividends of $8 a share, of which a substantial portion went to a wealthy young yachtsman, reputed to hold some 500,000 shares. When the depression forced the railroad to pass its dividend for the first time in many years, thus depriving the yachtsman of his usual $1,000,000 quarterly payment, the auditor is reported to have burst into tears.

Not every auditor takes so deeply to heart the plight of the stockholders who—theoretically—employ him, but in the ranks from "junior executive" upward loyalty is the rule and, furthermore, does not vary with the salary received. For $5,000 or for $50,000 a year, a good and faithful servant is willing to bribe legislators, suborn perjury, obtain the dismissal of honest but/and hostile school teachers and college instructors, ruin independent newspapers, snuff out competitors by a colorful assortment of illegal means, and, briefly, do anything and everything short of betraying his country.

"Short of?" Precisely how short, you may ask. Short, as the Persian poet pointed out in his quatrain upon infinitesimal differences, may in certain cases be very short indeed. In fact, many persons are inclined to believe that in some recent instances it has reached the vanishing-point.

Let us stress here what must be clear from the foregoing. There is no question, there is no charge, of *personal* gain, of *personal* motive, of *personal* disloyalty. If there is any charge, it is of too much loyalty, of loyalty directed toward the wrong—or the lesser—institution. Such excessive loyalty, it would seem, has led corporation officials in Washington to retard the production of the essential materials of war by (1) opposing necessary plant expansion (because of a well-justified fear of excess production *after* the war); (2) attempting to keep within their own plants secrets of industrial processes, though the output of these plants has been demonstrated to be insufficient for our war effort (the basis for this is obvious and natural, from the corporate point of view); (3) preventing smaller plants, the "independents," from obtaining war contracts (no business men, except the "independents" in question, will doubt the wisdom of this).

Thus the only three charges that can be brought against these corporation executives in Washington—dollar-a-year men and others—fall of their own weight when tested by sound business judgment. Nevertheless, they cannot be dismissed so easily. For it must be appar-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ent even in the holiest and best-guarded of corporation sanctuaries that, for better or worse, the world is being remade, and that precepts and practices which won wealth and honor before this war may during this war bring only dishonor and death.

Let us revert for a moment to the undoubted and unchallenged loyalty exhibited by corporation executives —to their corporations. Apparently it has never occurred to anyone to ask whether this loyalty is what in happier days was called one-sided but now must be termed unilateral. Perhaps the answer was too obvious to require the question, for of course such loyalty is a strictly one-way, not a round-trip, affair. Can you imagine the embattled stockholders of General Hydrocarbons marching on Washington to the song:

> And shall Trelawney die?
> Here's twenty thousand Cornish men
> Will know the reason why.

No, gentlemen's gentlemen of industry, put not your trust in stockholders. But perhaps you are counting upon your Board of Directors to protect you? Never was hope more vain! Your directors will take the profits you bring them—but wash their hands of you at the first intimation of real danger. They are as loyal to the corporation as you are; they will point out to you that IT cannot be compromised by too vigorous efforts in your behalf. And they will insist that the policy you have pursued was not only unauthorized but in direct violation of their instructions. Do you doubt this? If you do, you have only to call to mind the men who make up your board; ask yourself, "Which of these individuals will endanger himself for *me?*"

Nor is the matter of "danger" altogether fanciful. The American public has just begun to get into this war. Soon there will scarcely be a household that has not given one or two young men—or men not so young—to the armed forces. To date—excluding the disaster of Pearl Harbor—our own army and navy have been extraordinarily successful; whenever they have met the enemy on anything like even terms they have been victorious. We may hope and we do hope that these successes will continue, but in war there must be defeats just as there are victories—and even victories are costly. As casualty lists lengthen, the mood of our people will change. We shall demand to know why—and why—and why.

These questions will produce answers. And some of these answers may point to you.

Short-Wave Artillery

BY STEFAN J. RUNDT

TWENTY-THREE short-wave transmitters are now used for broadcasts from the United States to foreign countries. Fourteen of these are international transmitters, licensed by the government and used twenty-four hours a day. Nine are commercial (code) stations, used occasionally for certain voice broadcasts.

The Nazi High Command and Dr. Goebbels have never told how many short-wave stations they have, but it is known that at Zeesen near Berlin, alone, they muster at least fifteen transmitters. In Germany proper, Luxembourg, the "Protectorate" (formerly Czecho-Slovakia), and the "Government General" (Poland) they have about thirty stations, many of them high-powered. If one includes stations in Holland, Belgium, occupied France, Norway, the Baltic countries, Greece, occupied Russia, and Serbia, the Reich Radio Company operates or controls a minimum of fifty stations of various range and power. With Italy, Slovakia, Hungary, Finland, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Rumania thrown in, the Axis controls in Europe some seventy-odd short-wave stations—possibly, with recent additions, close to ninety—as against our fourteen regular and nine part-time transmitters. More than twenty of these Axis stations are among the most powerful in the world. Italy alone owns just about as many "Big Berthas" as we do. Even when all English short-wave transmitters are counted, the enemy in Europe maintains a superiority of at least three to two. With Japan, which controls about fifty stations, included, the Axis powers outnumber the United Nations two to one in high-powered, long-range senders. For short-wave transmitters of various power the ratio is at least five to three (this includes Allied international stations in Australia, India, Chungking, and the Soviet Union).

Not only does the Axis have the advantage on the short-wave front; it also has several hundred medium-wave transmitters—comparable to local stations in the United States—that can be used for broadcasts to nearby countries. The United Nations have such stations only in the British Isles. The Axis has the geographical advantage of being able to broadcast propaganda from stations of comparatively limited range.

Over each transmitter several frequencies may be broadcast. Our American installations cross-fire with fifty-odd frequencies. Great Britain broadcasts with nearly sixty. The Axis in Europe uses 125 frequencies or more—Germany 65, Italy 30. In Asia the Broadcasting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Corporation of Japan operates on not fewer than 50 wave lengths. In international multi-language transmissions the Axis employs, on a conservative estimate, wave lengths that aggregate some 280 against the scant 190 of the United Nations. (These figures do not include Vichy stations in unoccupied France, Dakar, Morocco, Algiers, or Martinique, or Franco's Spanish broadcasts, all of which must be considered anti-democratic.)

American stations broadcast regularly in two dozen languages, occasionally in others. The B. B. C. broadcasts in forty-two idioms, Berlin in thirty-nine, Rome in thirty, Japan in thirty-one. While Japan instructs the world in Esperanto and Fukienese, we do not broadcast even in Persian, though the attitude of Iran is extremely important now because of the Caucasus situation. Radio Helsinki goes on the air in fourteen languages over short and medium waves. The threat of the Vichy navy hangs like the sword of Damocles over our heads, but we have not as yet begun to broadcast in Breton, the language of a large proportion of the French naval personnel.

Not a single American short-wave broadcast can be picked up on more than four dial positions. Radio Berlin, on the other hand, often sends out regularly scheduled programs which may be tuned in on seven loggings of a reasonably good home set in the United States. A layman "cruising" over the short-wave bands will catch Berlin on so many points that he will hardly be able to escape its broadcasts. Here it must be pointed out that all comparisons were even more in the enemy's favor a short time ago.

Our overseas programs still cling to fifteen-minute newscast periods or commentary schedules in one given language. The B. B. C. has successfully introduced five- and ten-minute broadcasts. Radio Roma has raised its geographical coverage by using ten-minute shows. Our coverage could be improved 50 or 75 per cent by the change. The high lights of the latest news can easily be presented in five minutes.

Our enemies consider psychological warfare of the utmost importance in this total struggle. More than 15 per cent of all Nazi broadcasting time, both short-wave and standard, is reserved for non-German programs. A reliable expert estimates that Japan apportions fully 30 per cent of its total time on the air to broadcasts in foreign languages.

Since our radio arsenal is on the whole smaller and less powerful than the enemy's, we must compensate for our kilowatt and quantitative inferiority by a superior psychological approach. In other words, we must prepare the best broadcasts possible. Most persons acquainted with the full picture of our international transmissions agree privately that we have a long way to go before we discover the right words, the best methods of presentation, the most dynamic speakers. Some believe that our broadcasts to Latin America do full justice to American ingenuity. Others hold that despite our comparatively long experience there, and despite Nelson Rockefeller's hard-working organization, our broadcasts directed south of the Rio Grande are far short of what they should be. But in any case our efforts to reach Europe do not yet approach adequacy. Several weeks ago, for instance, one company seriously considered broadcasting a German version of the Hardy Family serial "to exemplify life in America" for listeners in the Reich. Similar bright ideas are constantly cropping up. Often the obvious truth that listeners in Himmler's domain, who risk their very lives every time they pick up a democratic transmission, want mainly facts seems completely neglected. It is true that 75 per cent of our broadcasts to Europe are now newscasts—these have proved to be the best weapon—but the percentage could well be increased. As for talks, a concise, technical lesson on how to sabotage ball bearings does more good than all the eulogies of democracy, however noble.

Scripts for international broadcasts should be prepared by professional experts only—that is, by those who have an intimate knowledge of the ethnic and psychological characteristics, the historical, social, and geographical background, the emotional reactions, and even the dialects of the people to whom the broadcasts are aimed. We have no time to train hastily hired amateurs. Perhaps in our presentation of news we should emphasize more the fact that we are actual participants in the war—and not only in production. "British lose Bardia" seems to imply that we are bystanders. Why not "We lose Bardia"? And why not admit losses sooner? Listeners will believe us more readily if we do. Script writers should listen more frequently to Axis transmissions to know specifically whom and what we are fighting. We may also learn a great deal from the B. B. C. Since 1939 London broadcasts in many languages have reached a high level of excellence. Lindley Fraser, talking to Germans from Britain, and Colonel Harold R. Stevens, former British military attaché in Rome, addressing Italians, are master tacticians. The many underground "freedom stations" can also teach us new ways of approach. Terminology and technique must be studied. A closer liaison between monitors (listeners to foreign broadcasts) and script writers of outgoing material would be beneficial. The accuracy of scripts should be checked and double-checked as rigorously as bomb loads for our flying fortresses are checked before their take-off. Enemy lies should be replied to more quickly—within the hour, not the next day. "Last Monday Berlin claimed . . ." is not nearly so effective as "Forty minutes ago we were surprised to learn from the Rome Radio that Mme Litvinov is a prisoner in Siberia; actually, she is having luncheon at the White House and is just finishing her coffee at this moment." In turn, our own assertions and denials

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must become more fool-proof than they are now. Goebbels wastes no time in kicking back to us every little boner. The least discrepancy in our broadcasts is fuel for the Axis propaganda machine. If N. B. C. and Radio Schenectady differ in the slightest in the reporting of an item, the Axis stuffs our carelessly uttered words down our throat. Often a phrase that comes naturally to us may contain a hidden insult to the very audience we are trying to reach and hold. Often a piece of advice given by us in the complete safety of an air-conditioned studio must sound like sheer madness to an anti-Nazi listener in Gestapo-ridden Europe.

Many of the analyses of Axis broadcasts prepared in this country indicate the enemy's weakness and the points which our transmissions should make. For example, the Nazi radio says that two departments of the Berlin Food and Agriculture Ministry have just been taken over by the S. S. "in agreement with Himmler." Hitler has promised special premiums to German farmers who deliver (not who produce) more dairy products. Why not immediately stab into this obvious breach with special broadcasts to German farmers? Virtually all princes of the Catholic church in Germany are under house arrest. Why not, then, provide more programs of religious news for the millions of Catholics in the Reich? The B. B. C. constantly aims its German transmissions at special groups—workers, housewives, the army, navy, or merchant marine.

The material we now broadcast to Europe needs a great deal of pruning. A Dane in Nazi-held Copenhagen does not care to learn—at the peril of his life—how the New York *Herald Tribune* reacted editorially to Churchill's second visit to Washington. He will draw his own conclusions about the meeting. He would much rather hear when we expect to overcome the U-boat sinkings along our shores—or whether it is true that cholera is raging in Bombay. When special speakers, the foremost American commentators, are presented or quoted, this same Dane may not know who they are. On the other hand, he would like to hear Karin Michaëlis or Jean Hersholt.

To broadcast to Germany doubtful reports of "20,000 killed in Cologne in R. A. F. raid" can do us more harm than good. If we just say, in conformity with the known facts, that 1,036 planes raided that town and that large fires were still burning thirty-two hours later, we shall score better and, what is most important, establish greater trustworthiness.

Our regular English-language programs, which total nearly 20 per cent of our transmissions to Europe, could be cut, and many could be eliminated. We hardly need to communicate with our English-speaking allies quite as much as we do. Broadcasts to the conquered peoples in their own tongues are far more important. To be sure, many Europeans understand English, and it may have a certain lure for them, but the average man still gets more when he listens to his mother tongue—for all the static and the "jamming" of Berlin's interference.

Our news broadcasts for Norwegians, Frenchmen, Poles, and other nationalities are generally translated from the same English material. But the main interests of these audiences are very different. Even Germans and Austrians want different kinds of news and want it given with a different choice of words and different German inflections.

Speakers who address Europe in the name of America should be more carefully chosen than they are now. Berlin maintains a special school to train all speakers in technique and "mike manner." Many of our commentators *read* their scripts and are obviously unable to *speak* naturally in the language they are using, say, in colloquial French. There should be preparations and rehearsals for certain feature programs. If 20,000,000 American consumers are to be urged to buy a nationally advertised product, is not the show rehearsed?

The expressions used must be idiomatically correct and up to date, not a literal translation of English. If military reports use the terms current in Germany today, they will be more readily understood. The Nazi Supreme Command, for instance, is the "OKW" (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*) to a German of today; its daily communiqué is the *Heeresbericht*—and nothing else! New York must be *Nuova York* for Italians. No Slovak will grasp MacArthur's name if we lisp the *th* and slur the *ur*. Less well-known names or names difficult for foreigners could be spelled out, as is frequently done, for example, by Radio Melbourne or the B. B. C.

Many of our broadcasters to Europe still suffer from various émigré complexes. Others have come so much under the spell of America that they must sound like foreigners—though not like Americans—to those in their home countries. Many of these speakers are professorial in their approach. They have either learned to speak the language at Harvard or they have been at Princeton so long they have forgotten it. Often their remarks are so letter perfect that they sound like a recitation in a dead language. Not long ago a professional short-wave listener was asked by an overseas speaker whether "the B. B. C. in its service for Holland reads daily the *complete* Jap communiqué." How, one wonders, could such a man be intrusted with the task of correlating factually or emotionally our war aims with the mentality of his audience? Mere eloquence about human dignity, civilization, or liberty cannot, in the long run, hold and enlarge our radio audience abroad. We must also give the leaders of a future revolt the news and information they need.

A year ago our short-wave offensive was qualitatively and quantitatively many times weaker than it is today.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Through the efforts of Elmer Davis and his staff a great deal has been accomplished. But we must improve still farther and above all more consistently. Haphazard selection and duplications of material must stop. Our ideological campaign must be planned and executed with the precision of a commando raid. Our strategy must be centrally directed. We must catch up with the enemy and then beat him. Organization of the war of words equals in importance any other government function. If effective, it may save millions of lives and billions of dollars and shorten the conflict by years.

[*This discussion of short-wave techniques is to be followed in early issues by articles suggesting specific propaganda approaches to the German and Japanese people.*]

Hollywood Belligerent

BY EZRA GOODMAN

Hollywood, August 31

HOLLYWOOD, long one of the most insular communities in the country, has been shaken by the war out of its cultural and political isolation into a sharp awareness of world events. It has felt the impact of the war more directly, perhaps, than other sections. It is surrounded by army encampments, anti-aircraft and balloon barrages, and plane and arms factories. It has experienced a large influx of refugees from Europe. Many of its directing spirits—John Ford, Frank Capra, Darryl Zanuck, William Wyler, Garson Kanin—are working with the armed forces, and the number of its actors in uniform increases every day. The production schedules of the major studios are featuring war films ranging from "Mission to Moscow" to "The Moon Is Down."

Not so long ago Hollywood was turning out films like "Ninotchka" and "Comrade X," which aroused ill-will in Soviet Russia, "Gunga Din," which precipitated riots in India, and "Down Argentine Way," which was hissed off South American screens. Today its point of view has changed. "Mission to Moscow," Warner Brothers has promised, will be a fair and square treatment of the subject. Erskine Caldwell, author of "All Out on the Road to Smolensk," is writing the screen play, and the production is in the hands of Robert Buckner, former Moscow correspondent of the London *Daily Mail*. Ex-Ambassador Joseph E. Davies has turned over his private files and papers to the studio for research material. The characters, it has been announced, will include many real persons, such as Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Molotov, and Litvinov. Other studios are pursuing the theme with "Scorched Earth," "Song of the Red Army," and "The Road to Moscow."

Under the aegis of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, most of the major studios are turning out shorts about various phases of life in the United States intended for South American consumption. Walt Disney and a staff of artists visited South America recently and made several animated cartoons featuring Donald Duck and Mickey Mouse in typical Latin American settings. The Mexican screen villain is definitely out.

Lillian Hellman's bitter, anti-fascist drama "Watch on the Rhine" is being transferred to the screen with the assistance of Herman Shumlin, producer of the play, and five members of the Broadway cast. Practically no changes have been made in the original play except to take advantage of the wider scope of the camera. Ben Hecht is producing his own "China Girl" with a contemporary Chinese background. "The Edge of Darkness," William Woods's novel about the Nazi invasion of Norway, is being filmed by Lewis Milestone and will be one of the more important productions of the season. After some casting trouble Hemingway's "For Whom the Bell Tolls" is being brought to the screen with Sam Wood, creator of "Our Town" and "Goodbye, Mr. Chips," directing, and Gary Cooper and Ingrid Bergman playing the principal parts. John Steinbeck's "The Moon Is Down" will go into production soon under the supervision of Nunnally Johnson, who made "The Grapes of Wrath." The film version will avoid the criticism directed against the novel and the Broadway play that they presented the Nazis in too favorable a light. Paul Muni is to appear in "The Commandos Come at Dawn," with production supervised by Lieutenant Commander John Farrow.

"Random Harvest," James Hilton's novel of a shell-shocked British soldier, has been completed by Mervyn LeRoy, with Greer Garson and Ronald Colman in the cast. An ambitious saga of Flying Fortresses and Pearl Harbor is now being filmed by Howard Hawks in cooperation with the United States army, under the title of "Air Force." "Desperate Journey," about an R. A. F. bombing expedition, "Casablanca," about the underground passport trade in the refugee melting-pot of French Morocco, "Clear for Action," a navy drama, and "Thunder Birds," an aviation odyssey, will soon be shown. "Wake Island," dealing with the heroic American defense of that Pacific bastion, has already made its appearance and been widely commended.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not dealing directly with the war but reflecting current problems are Leo McCarey's "Once upon a Honeymoon," a comedy-drama with a European setting, and "Talk of the Town," which finds its climax in a lynch scene and trial. The latter is directed by George Stevens, who made "Woman of the Year." Stevens will next do a film version of Kaufman and Hart's "The American Way." Franz Werfel's "The Song of Bernadette" is in preparation as a parable on modern intolerance. The success of "Yankee Doodle Dandy," based on the career of George M. Cohan, and "Pride of the Yankees," about Lou Gehrig, has turned the attention of producers to indigenous American themes and personalities, and "The Adventures of Mark Twain" and "The Ox-Bow Incident" are receiving lavish production.

The studios are avidly purchasing stories dealing with such subjects as Bataan, the underground movements in Europe, army nurses, and the paratroops. The enthusiasm accorded "Mrs. Miniver" has confirmed Hollywood's belief that moviegoers want either bold and forthright films about things that matter today or pictures completely divorced from current events. The public has indicated its apathy toward productions that take vital themes and reduce them to the level of vapid entertainment. "Escapist" film fare is, of course, still being produced; musicals, comedies, and spectacles fill out the production programs. One of the pictures doing the biggest business at the moment is Cecil DeMille's "Reap the Wild Wind," a Technicolor spectacle of the Florida keys, and such musicals as "My Gal Sal" and "Holiday Inn" and excursions into romantic fiction like "Tales of Manhattan" are extremely popular.

The activity at the studios is spurred by the executives' recognition that no one knows what the next few months may bring in the film industry. Raw film stock, which uses many elements that go into explosives, is now under government priority regulations, and the use of film has been drastically restricted. The ceiling for the cost of construction of a set is $5,000, and much ingenuity is being exercised in adapting standing sets to new stories. It is practically impossible to obtain any new cameras, lights, or other mechanical equipment. Location trips are being eliminated to save tires. Realizing that future production may be still more restricted or even suspended, Hollywood is trying to accumulate a backlog of completed pictures.

By making bold and courageous pictures about the war the film industry is demonstrating its emergence from its mental shell. It still has a long way to go. It has yet to realize the essential seriousness of the war as a theme; it has yet to remove the last blonde from the bombers. England, Russia, and China are far more skilful than Hollywood in using the screen as a weapon of persuasion and propaganda, but the propaganda pictures of today when compared with those of the last war, "The Beast of Berlin," for example, show that there has been progress. The screen can be a most effective medium for creating understanding between the peoples of the United Nations and for affirming the democratic ideals that we are fighting for. It is a responsibility that Hollywood cannot afford to shirk.

In the Wind

THE COMMON TOUCH: At the meeting of one hundred scholars called last week at Columbia University, Professor Harry A. Overstreet, the popular philosopher, said: "As the ordinary man might say it, a pluralistic civilization might not be a civilization all of one kind, but a civilization of many kinds cooperating among themselves."

J. B. MATTHEWS, the Research Director of the Dies committee, recently asserted that his enemies had broken into his house in New Jersey, ransacked his files, and destroyed 2,000 books. According to the Associated Press, "Matthews recalled that he had been in the house about three days before several boys in the vicinity noticed the damage."

ALTHOUGH CONSTRUCTION on two new war plants in Flint, Michigan—A. C. Spark Plug and Chevrolet—has been indefinitely postponed because of the materials shortage, the War Production Board has given permission to J. C. Penney and Company to build a large department store in that city. J. C. Penney had the necessary materials on hand, and the WPB apparently did not choose to freeze them.

A NUMBER of conscientious objectors have been selected to join a group of army and navy officers who are studying to become administrative officials in occupied countries. The pacifists will be trained as civilian aides to the military men.

LARGE STORES of rubber set aside for the manufacture of gas masks are being released for other needs. The army has found that the butyl substitute is a much better resistant to mustard gas than natural rubber. It is also unaffected by oil and gasoline.

THE WORKERS' DEFENSE LEAGUE reports that for the first time since the defense program began employers who file their requirements with government agencies are specifying racial and religious preferences. The W. D. L. believes that efforts to prevent discrimination by employers have noticeably slackened since the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices was made responsible to Paul V. McNutt.

GERMAN SHORT-WAVE PROPAGANDA on Brazil's declaration of war has pointedly refrained from attacking President Vargas, directing most of its attention to the machinations of the United States and Great Britain.

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.*]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS and the ARTS

C. B. S.—Berlin the Third

LAST TRAIN FROM BERLIN. By Howard K. Smith. Alfred A. Knopf. $2.75.

NOW here, thank heaven, is a book about Germany with an out-and-out anti-fascist point of view, and that view a clear-cut Socialist one. And here, thank heaven again, is an author who does not miss his one big opportunity. Mr. Smith, the latest in the long line of C. B. S. Berlin correspondents to be published by Mr. Knopf, gives a precise answer to *the* one important question.

The only purpose a convinced anti-fascist can have just now in reading yet another book about Germany is to discover, if he can, some clue to how the regime may be brought down. One cannot expect to find military information of any importance, but it is reasonable to hope that one may obtain a clear vision of the structure of German morale, into which our propaganda may be able to thrust its levers. There is no shilly-shallying about Mr. Smith, who left Germany the day of Pearl Harbor. He knows perfectly well that we shall read him only if he tells us about the effects of the Russian campaign on the German people. He does tell us, with clarity and in detail, and with frank appraisal of the sources of his information. Yes, the terrific cost of that campaign and the repeated lies and blunders of German rulers have almost totally discredited Nazi propaganda within the Reich and irreparably damaged German morale. The malady is a progressive one. C. B. S.—Berlin the First told us that the German people felt no joyful enthusiasm at the defeat of France. C. B. S.—Berlin the Second (Harry Flannery) scored a good point in telling us that though the German folk had no special reason to doubt the first few broadcasts about stupendous victories in Russia, they were unmoved or openly disgusted because of the obvious propaganda technique utilized. The bacillus of the disease had long ago begun to produce its anti-bodies in the blood stream of the nation. To live in an enduring dictatorship, it has been said, is to be condemned to perpetual enthusiasm. Rather one would say that it is to be sentenced to universal skepticism. I dare say a German, the day after world victory, would glance nervously at the unvanquished moon.

C. B. S.—Berlin the Third (Mr. Smith) describes a later stage of the process and confirms his report in another way. Most of the Germans he met hated the Russians, though not with the deformed and embittered hatred they had for Americans. Their hatred became pathologically violent after the Red Army had made its weight and valor felt. It requires little psychological insight to see the significance and the use of this information.

President Roosevelt's policy of stepping up the degree of our hostility stage by stage was dictated by internal necessity. Mr. Smith makes one believe, however, that no better way of sawing at German nerves could have been discovered. The Nazis were being handled with their own morale-destroying technique of intervention short of declared war. Until the Russians had given the German people the telescope they needed to see the end of this war, the American intervention was the source of an anxiety that was not so powerful that it was bound to create a neurosis. But afterward, with possible victory already shown to be a long way off, American intervention began to give the Germans a will-destroying sense of parallel with World War I.

Here, one believes, is guidance for our propaganda effort. The German people, one sadly confesses, are not likely to believe our talk about a just peace. As a whole they are not likely to have a lively affection for our sort of democracy. What we must do, then, is to intensify their sense of parallel between this war and the last in so far as the effects of American belligerence are concerned. Their nerves are weak because of that last experience.

There is one classic source that all readers of contemporary books about Germany and our propagandists in particular ought to have in their hands. That is the report of the Reichstag Inquiry into the German Collapse of 1918. For this writer that inquiry, more than any work on the Russian Revolution, established four propositions as scientific truths. So long as there is belief in victory great losses do not shatter a major nation's nerve. When once the belief in victory has been shaken, the effect of losses grows by leaps and bounds. It is the resultant desire for peace which causes revolt. If peace is instantly obtained, the revolution does not go deep, which is to say that people revolt to obtain peace, not to transform society.

Mr. Smith's report, illuminated by these propositions, suggests such interesting thoughts that one must urge its reading. One may not attribute the same importance to palace revolutions as he does. One may believe his description of the Nazi regime as merely the dictatorship of capital to be a misleading simplification. One may dislike his occasional excesses and be jolted by the unevenness of his writing. But there is no doubt that Mr. Smith has written an extremely useful book. Look, there is Mr. Shirer with two companions. "How do you do, Mr. Shirer; how do you do, Mr. Smith!"

RALPH BATES

The Progressive Psyche

SELF-ANALYSIS. By Karen Horney. W. W. Norton and Company. $3.

READERS of this review, like its writer, will be diffident of judging the technical grounds on which Dr. Karen Horney has forced a schism in the ranks of American psychoanalysis. But Dr. Horney is not only a clinical physician; one of the few psychoanalytical writers of recent years to capture the imagination of the general public, she has established a philosophy of human nature and society on the basis of her divergence from Freud and has become, not one of the seminal, but surely one of the symptomatic minds of our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time. Her work, therefore, may be judged not merely in a professional but also in a cultural context.

In her latest book Dr. Horney carries her rejection of Freud's theories about as far as it can go short of an explicit denial of the unconscious mind; she propounds the belief that by adapting the techniques of regular analysis a neurotic person can effectually psychoanalyze himself. Judging by the criteria available to a layman, it seems to me that Dr. Horney makes but a weak case for her belief. The evidence she adduces is, in point of quantity, not adequate; in all propriety, so important an idea—important because it controverts one of Freud's fundamental concepts but important too because it is sure to raise hope in so many hearts—should be advanced on a wider and firmer ground of fact. Dr. Horney cites but four illustrative cases of "occasional self-analysis"—that is, of people who, equipped with some degree of psychoanalytical knowledge, were able by their own efforts to gain insight into and relief from some simply motivated psychic disturbance. Of systematic self-analysis she gives but a single example, and the case of Clare, a young woman who ventured into self-analysis after a year and a half of analysis with Dr. Horney, is possibly suggestive but not convincing. This patient no doubt advanced her understanding of her unconscious motives and thereby won a measure of emotional freedom; yet it is not entirely clear why her discoveries about herself—they are not remarkably deep—were not in large part her belated, developing realization of insights to which she had been helped by Dr. Horney in the course of her regular analysis.

In place of evidence Dr. Horney gives us argument and moral exhortation. The argument is dashing but verbalistic and prestidigitary; I shall touch on some of its assumptions below, but I cannot help feeling that, in a popular book like this, exhortation is even more important than argument and that the exhortation is a little irresponsible. When Dr. Horney suggests that one of the advantages of self-analysis is the pride that comes from getting out of neurotic difficulties all by oneself, she implies assent to the popular feeling that there is something "humiliating" about psychoanalysis; and it is hard not to contemplate the even greater pride we might get from bringing ourselves up. When she tells us that, after all, a neurotic lives with himself all the time and therefore knows himself better than anyone else can, I do not understand her. When she tells us that "life itself is the best therapist," I find her trivial.

Then, too, I am disturbed by Dr. Horney's inconsistency in her own statements of the scope and value of self-analysis; she insists on its feasibility, says that some self-analysts have "dealt with problems that are generally deemed inaccessible even with the help of an analyst" and that some have succeeded where analysts have failed, questions whether self-analysis may not be conducted even without the occasional help and supervision which, as a general rule, she feels to be necessary; but when she commits herself to a summation of the possible effectiveness of self-analysis, she is far from sanguine: "Therefore after a period of common work with an analyst even patients who started with severe neurotic difficulties may in some cases be able to continue on their own, if necessary." I feel that a conclusion so tentative on a matter so important should have been confined to a scientific paper, not communicated with enthusiasm and more than a hint of promise to a general public always avid for new ways of psychic self-help.

For psychoanalytical theory the crucial point of "Self-Analysis" is its substantial denial of Freud's theory of "resistance." According to Freud, the neurosis, however painful, serves a certain purpose; the very symptoms which are so painful cloak impulses which the patient fears and cannot cope with. Even when they are pointed out to him by the analyst, the patient is likely to deny their existence because they are repulsive to his morals and pride; indeed, for a long time he will not even perceive them, for, perverse as the idea may seem, there are powerful forces in the unconscious mind which desire the unhappy neurotic status quo. Dr. Horney does not, to be sure, explicitly reject the theory of resistance which is so basic to the theory of the unconscious, but she does everything possible to minimize the fierce stubbornness Freud attributes to it. She insists that with the right spirit and a sufficient will (knowledge is of far less importance), the patient will be able to bring to light the hidden elements which the unconscious is at such pains to hide. No doubt it is the easier for Dr. Horney to maintain this because in her present book there is no slightest mention of those unconscious drives which are so horrifying to our conscious minds, such as homosexuality, sadism, masochism, Oedipus feelings. (Of course, many educated persons nowadays are willing to admit finding these elements in themselves, but their perception is at most a "novelistic" one, far short in intensity of a psychoanalytical realization.) The effect of Dr. Horney's position is that, though she continues to affirm her belief in the unconscious, she actually denies it by making it an unconscious so easily accessible to an untrained person working on himself; she seems to be talking rather of an "unawareness" or of what, by popular habit, is so often and so significantly substituted for unconscious, a "subconscious."

I have spoken of Dr. Horney as one of the symptomatic minds of our time; she is symptomatic—and most notably in her latest book—of one of the great inadequacies of liberal thought, the need for optimism. It seems to me that her denial or attenuation of most of Freud's concepts is the response to the wishes of an intellectual class which has always found Freud's ideas cogent but too stringent and too dark. They have always wanted a less tragic and strenuous psychology, a more reasonable, decent, and cooperative psyche, and Dr. Horney, in all her three books, has given them what they want.

The basis of Dr. Horney's divergence from Freud is an emotional one; her protest is always that Freud sets gloomy bounds to man's nature, that he is negative, cynical, without "faith." In her present book she quotes with approval a passage from Max Otto: "The deepest source of man's philosophy, the one that shapes and nourishes it, is faith or lack of faith in mankind." But there is no such simple alternative and it is dangerous to suppose there is—as we see when we understand what "faith in mankind" means for Dr. Horney. It means the belief that man is "free" and "good"—she has revived those old, absolute simplicities of eighteenth-century liberalism. To assert man's "freedom" she attacks Freud for finding man's psyche biologically deter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mined; she often speaks of Freud as an old-fashioned dualist (it is clear that he is quite the opposite), but actually her own passionate rejection of the biological determination of mind constitutes a dualism of the most sterile sort and puts the attributes of body in a "lower" place. Further, in attacking Freud for his biological orientation, she makes the tiresome old mistake of confusing mind with the determinants of mind. Then, in the place of Freud's biological determination she puts a determination by culture: there can be no doubt that Dr. Horney has done psychoanalysis a service by forcing the cultural issue; Freud's views of culture, though suggestive, are surely not adequate. But Dr. Horney's view of culture is both vague and formalistic. Sometimes culture is a norm by which we judge whether or not a certain way of action is neurotic, but then again a culture may itself be neurotic, though by what norm we judge the culture (possibly a biological one?) we are not told. In Dr. Horney's hands culture becomes as much an absolute as she claims biology is in Freud's; but Freud saw a complex and passionate interplay betwen biology and culture, whereas Dr. Horney sees the individual infant as a kind of box into which culture drops this trend or that. The Freudian man may not be as free as we should like, but at least he has insides.

Then, in order to affirm that man is "good," Dr. Horney, like Erich Fromm, attacks Freud's theory of morals for representing morals as arising from forces themselves not virtuous. This Dr. Horney calls a fallacy of genesis, which of course it is not. She represents Freud as implying that virtue is not virtue because it springs from destructive or anarchic origins, but this Freud never does imply—Dr. Horney, by the way, is not the most reliable expositor of Freud; indeed, if anyone has committed the genetic fallacy, Dr. Horney has done so by implying that virtue can only be virtue if it springs from innate (biological?) virtue.

If we are to talk of faith in man, in the realistic rather than the sentimental sense of that phrase, it seems to me that of the two psychologies it is Freud's that demonstrates faith by daring to present man with the terrible truth of his own nature. When Dr. Horney speaks of faith, she does not mean faith so much as optimism, that emptiest of words. The psyche she has described has won wide assent in liberal, progressive circles exactly because it is a progressive psyche, a kind of New Deal agency which truly intends to do good but cannot always cope with certain reactionary forces. It is a flattering view of the mind and Freud's is not, but Freud's has the advantage of suggesting the savage difficulties of life.

LIONEL TRILLING

Bon Voyage, S. V. B.

SELECTED WORKS OF STEPHEN VINCENT BENÉT. Farrar and Rinehart. Two Volumes. $5.

WHEN an author advances to meet posterity in the full panoply of a collected edition, it is up to the critic, posing as posterity, to inspect the basis of his reputation. Mr. Benét is now best known as the author of "John Brown's Body," which receives pride of place in this edition. How is it possible for a writer to achieve his greatest fame by the least satisfactory of his works? Perhaps there is no generally valid answer; each case must be explained as it occurs. In that of "John Brown's Body," which is now fifteen years old, posterity is just around the corner, which helps. After all the nostalgic charades and illiterate paeans to Main Street flung at us by Hollywood and others, resistance is high when we are asked to reread an epical interpretation of the Civil War in terms of 1927. And that very resistance makes it clear that "John Brown's Body" is no more profound in message or perceptive in the reading of history than "Gone with the Wind," and less interesting as a story. This despite the earnest interpretative intentions, the "quest of the American Muse" announced at its outset. Mr. Benét aimed high, and felt his subject as an ancestral tragedy; but tragedy must be a conflict between equally credible forces, and his presentation of the South merely exploits the commonplaces about overblown romanticism ill concealing the crime of slavery—as if they had ever thrown any light on the subject. Moreover, its whole appeal of plot and character rests on figures too obviously chosen to illustrate history like pictures in a textbook. One gets very bored with "Jake Diefer, the barrel-chested Pennsylvanian," "Luke Breckinridge, the gawky boy from the hills," and all that crowd of purely regional, not psychological, types, symbols of a superficial topography of attitudes. But—and here we approach our answer—these vague emotional reactions to the Civil War coincide with certain publicly felt demands. Still uneasy about the meaning of the conflict, folk-memory has not yet transmuted it into myth, so that imaginative evocations of it are especially welcome if they appear to facilitate shared

Learn to Speak SPANISH
FRENCH, GERMAN or ITALIAN This Easy Way

Know a second language for better business or social position; read foreign books; really enjoy travel. Speak like a native. Now FUN to learn quickly, easily at home as thousands have! Write today for free book "The Cortina Short-Cut." State language interested in.
CORTINA ACADEMY, Suite 589, 105 W. 40th St., N. Y. City

SPECIAL
Class Room Rate
only 25¢ monthly
per Student
for orders of ten or more copies
to be sent to one address.
Desk Copy Is Free!
ADDRESS YOUR ORDERS TO
THE Nation
55 FIFTH AVENUE • NEW YORK CITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opinions on its historical significance. With the lessening of such topical demands, the past can be poetized as story. Meanwhile only lyric poetry can universalize it permanently (Whitman's Lincoln elegy is an example), but an artistic anomaly, a subjective epic like "John Brown's Body," may give a convincing temporary imitation of that function.

Yet Mr. Benét, when not writing hundreds of pages of flat free verse, can be a poet, and can tell a first-rate story when not wrestling with attitudes toward history. I think posterity will treat him much like Stevenson. Some will ignore him; the young will treasure his adventure tales, especially "Spanish Bayonet"; and most people will like his ballads, love poems, and prose fantasies. At his unpretentious best he is a writer of sure skill and singular charm. But his efforts as interpreter of the American scene and the world crisis will be tactfully forgotten. No matter how fertile their imagination, little of worth results when writers who do not feel *prophetically* the power of ideas attempt to express social and historical truths. They succeed only in reflecting the prevalent prejudices of a changing social structure. It is significant that although "John Brown's Body" hardly mentions American problems of capital and labor, in 1936 Mr. Benét suddenly intones an Ode to the Austrian Socialists. Distance and Hitler lend unforeseen enchantment. Heights of platitude, too, are reached in "Tales of Our Time," which regale women who read women's magazines by catering to their stuffiest notions about The Home. I like to imagine D. H. Lawrence commenting on The Story About the Ant-Eater, in which a young couple who begin with ideas ("They had heard of Freud") happily end as dull as dull can be. He would probably consider it obscene. No, decidedly posterity will not approach Mr. Benét for intellectual reasons. But it was a great thing to write "Spanish Bayonet" in 1926 and "O'Halloran's Luck" in 1938, because posterity will thank its stars that someone in this grievous century could produce entertaining stories that are not murder mysteries and can be read twice.

FRANK JONES

Three German Poets

THREE POETS AND REALITY. By Ruth Hofrichter. Yale University Press. $2.

THE beginning and end of Professor Hofrichter's provocative little book seem, curiously, more satisfactory and substantial than the middle. In her study of a German, an Austrian, and a Swiss contemporary lyricist she was prompted to compare the consciously conceived image of the world with the representation of that world as it emerged in the poet's actual work, colored, modified, or completely altered by the forces of the unconscious. This formidable task, which Professor Hofrichter approaches with sympathy and insight, was further complicated by the fact that Carossa and Weinheber have remained poets at peace with, and honored by, the Nazi regime. These two, and the Swiss Albert Steffen, Professor Hofrichter believes to be the most significant poets in German literature today, and that not *faute de mieux:* "among the exiles I do not find their equal."

When it comes down to cases, Professor Hofrichter seems more convinced than convincing. Perhaps the trouble lies in her book's scope; she needs more room to demonstrate. Confronted more by paraphrase than by extended quotation, the reader lacks direct evidence to judge the poets' talent. Carossa appears a man of integrity, entitled to respect; the case for Weinheber is more dubious. In some ways he seems a good deal of a charlatan, or at best an artist *manqué,* become a rather weird and repellent neurotic. On the evidence, with all due respect for Professor Hofrichter and her thesis, the reader is forced to conclude that there is nothing in all these three poets together which one would not find, in fuller and more rewarding measure, in Rilke, whose garment they seem to have divided among them, to pull about their own inadequate shoulders. Or perhaps the mantle is really Goethe's, a thing of shreds and patches, after having been run through the mangle of Oswald Spengler and the decline of the West.

ROLFE HUMPHRIES

RECENTLY PUBLISHED

The Principles of Power: The Great Political Crises of History. By Guglielmo Ferrero. Putnam's. $3.50.

Food: A Weapon for Victory. By Bertram Fowler. Little, Brown. $1.50.

The Pre-Raphaelite Tragedy. By William Gaunt. Harcourt, Brace. $3.

The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads. By Wood Gray. Viking. $3.75.

Commando Attack. By Gordon Holman. Putnam's. $2.50.

Nazi Conquest of Danzig. By Hans L. Leonhardt. Chicago University. $3.50.

Brazil Under Vargas. By Karl Loewenstein. Macmillan. $2.75.

Stalin. By Emil Ludwig. Putnam's. $2.50.

India Without Fable: A 1942 Survey. By Kate L. Mitchell. Knopf. $2.50.

There Were Giants in the Land: Twenty-eight Historic Americans as Seen by Twenty-eight Contemporary Americans. With an Introduction by Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Farrar and Rinehart. $2.

Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy. By Elting E. Morison. Houghton Mifflin. $5.

The New Invitation to Learning. Edited by Mark Van Doren. Random House. $3.

Van Loon's Lives. By Hendrik Willem van Loon. Simon and Schuster. $3.95.

Economic Problems of War and Its Aftermath. Walgreen Foundation Lectures. Edited by Chester W. Wright. Chicago. $2.

Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms. G. and C. Merriam. $4.

CONTRIBUTORS

G. A. BORGESE, professor of Italian literature at the University of Chicago, is the author of "Goliath: The March of Fascism." A previous article, "A. E. F. to Siberia," was published in *The Nation* for April 11, 1942.

JAMES HENLE is the president of the Vanguard Press.

STEFAN J. RUNDT was formerly assistant supervisor of the N. B. C. short-wave receiving department. He is now on the staff of the United Press Listening Post.

EZRA GOODMAN is the film critic for *Common Sense.*

FRANK JONES, now teaching classics at Yale, has contributed articles, poems, and reviews to the *Partisan Review* and the *New Republic.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECORDS

FROM the beginning, six years ago, there have been occasional letters from readers of this column who have sighed over what a good music critic I would be if I didn't have that prejudice against Brahms. "Dogmatic" and "opinionated" are other words they have used; and I have also been told that attitudes like mine toward Brahms were something to keep to myself, not to express in print.

Those readers will forgive me for being amused by their assumption that only an estimate of Brahms as high as theirs could represent rational judgment of experience, and that an estimate as low as mine must represent prejudice in the face of experience. Actually, since I have repeatedly expressed my love for certain works of Brahms, my dislike of others cannot represent a prejudice against him. And actually both my likes and dislikes in Brahms are the product of more than twenty-five years' listening to the music, study of it, thought about it; for about half that period it was the music I cherished most; and then I began to be aware of qualities in the First Symphony, the concertos, the chamber music, that made me dislike these works which I had loved, while I continued to love the sets of variations on themes of Haydn and Paganini, the Fourth Symphony, some of the songs, which were not labored and pretentious and saccharine in the way I found the others to be.

My long experience, study, and thought have crystallized in my reasoned judgments of Brahms's music; my correspondents' experience, study, and thought have crystallized in their reasoned judgments; and their contention, in effect, is that where our judgments differ and I refuse to give up mine and accept theirs I am prejudiced, opinionated, dogmatic, and should have the decency to be silent. But a long developed and reasoned judgment, even when unfavorable, is not a prejudice; and while it is likely to be a strongly held and strongly expressed conviction, a man whose strongly held convictions are long developed and reasoned judgments cannot be called opinionated, and even his strong statements of such judgments cannot be called dogmatic. Moreover, he must be granted the right to the reasoned judgments he has arrived at through years of listening, study, and thought; and his function, his duty, his sole usefulness as a critic, if he is one, is to state them—to state, that is, the reasons with the judgments. For criticism is not the mere opinion that this piece of music is good and that one is bad, or this is a good performance and that is a bad one; it is the reasons for the opinion, in which the writer applies to what he has heard the illuminating insights that constitute his value to his readers.

From Bost Records, 29 West Fifty-seventh Street, New York, comes Volume 1 of "The Evolution of Piano Music" (Set ES 2: four 12-inch records in album; $6.25), which is devoted to music from 1350 to 1700, played on the harpsichord by Sylvia Marlowe, with a booklet of notes by Curt Sachs that begins with this paragraph: "The music in this album is not 'ancient music'; stale, dusty, and at best a curio for historically minded snobs. It is no more 'ancient' than Rembrandt's paintings or Gothic cathedrals. It is *music,* and excellent music, too. It is written in the style of generations past, but in a spirit that has not changed and will never change; the spirit of solid workmanship, pep, and genius."

As a person for whom a piece of music is something to be experienced as a work of art, not something to learn history from, I find only Frescobaldi's "La Frescobalda" on 107-A and Froberger's Toccata on 107-B impressive in what they convey, in the substance and structure through which they convey it, and in their mere size—for they are the only pieces that take a whole side. The others range from mildly pleasant to dull; and many are so short—three or four to a side—as to range from unsatisfying to irritating (the irritation coming partly from the fact that the sides are not grooved to connect one piece with the next, so that one has to raise the lid and place the needle several times for one side). They are, in fact, so slight in all respects as to make Dr. Sachs's reference to Rembrandt's paintings and Gothic cathedrals extravagant and absurd (there is a great deal more that needs to be said about the attitudes behind that aggressively defensive paragraph; but it will have to wait for an occasion when I have more space).

Others may feel sufficiently compensated for the dulness of an English dance dated 1350 by the knowledge that it "is in four parts, or *puncti,* either a *Stantipes, Ductia,* or *Nota,* the melody of which is written in the angular sings of mensural notation, while an accompanying part is marked out in letters—*g, a, d*—under the notes" and "the simple accompaniment in fifths, octaves, and occasional thirds . . . shows what kind of counterpoint the minstrels improvised when they fiddled with a singer or player." And it may be enough for them to know that "nothing could be more romantic" than Dr. Bull's jig "My Selfe"—meant as "a self-confession," and ending with a "half-humorous, half-melancholic question mark"—even if their twentieth-century ears can't hear it in the music.

The pieces are played with much vigor and little sensitiveness; the recorded sound of the performances is good; the surfaces are a little noisy.

B. H. HAGGIN

INFORMATION FOR SUBSCRIBERS

THE NATION, 55 Fifth Ave., New York. Price 15 cents a copy. By subscription—Domestic: One year $5; Two years $8; Three years $11. Additional Postage per year: Foreign, $1; Canadian, $1. The Nation is indexed in Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Index to Labor Articles, Public Affairs Information Service, Dramatic Index. Two weeks' notice and the old address as well as the new are required for change of address.

BOOKS

BOOK BARGAINS

Army Inductee's Mental Test	$ .25
Valor of Ignorance; Day of the Saxon: Homer Lea complete (paper ed.) both for	.50
Stedman's Comp. Pocket Guide to Europe ($3.50)	.50
Muirhead's "Blue Guides," $3-$6 list; French Alps; Southern Spain & Portugal; Normandy; 70 M. Around London (Macmillan) each	.50
Redemption of Democracy: H. Rauschning	.65
Smattering of Ignorance: Oscar Levant	.90
Embezzled Heaven: Franz Werfel	.90
Ellen Rogers: J. T. Farrell ($2.50 ed.)	1.00
James Joyce: Herbert Gorman ($3.50 ed.)	1.00
Mission to Moscow: Joseph E. Davies	1.45
Faith for Living: Lewis Mumford	1.45
Practice for the Army Tests	1.50
A Thousand Shall Fall: Hans Habe	1.65
The Tyranny of Words: Stuart Chase	1.65
Rise of American Civilization: Charles & Mary Beard (complete, 2 vols in 1)	3.85
Main Currents in American Thought: V. L. Parrington (complete, 3 vols. in 1)	3.45
The Silent Don: M. Sholokov (Comp. 2 vols. in 1)	3.50
Addresses of F. D. Roosevelt. Orig. 5 vols., $15 Random House only	4.85
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences: Editors Seligman & Johnson, new $45 reg. 8 vol.	32.50

Add 10c per book U. S. mailing on orders under $2

DOWNTOWN BOOK BAZAAR, 212 B'way, N. Y. C.

MEETING

THE GROUP FORUM

meets at Hotel Peter Stuyvesant—2 West 86th St.
TUES. EVE., SEPT. 15th, at 8:45 P.M.

JOHANNES STEEL

will speak on:

"The News of the Day"

(Notices mailed on request)

NOTICE *to* ADVERTISERS

The Dies Committee issue of *The Nation,* originally scheduled for publication on September 19, has been postponed to October 3.

On September 26, *The Nation* will initiate a new four-page section on political warfare, to be directed by J. Alvarez Del Vayo. Advertising forms for this issue close September 17.

The Fall Book Number is scheduled for October 17 publication; the Christmas Book Number, for December 5 or 12.

Advertising Department

THE NATION

55 FIFTH AVE. NEW YORK, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Letters to the Editors

What Are You Fighting for, Soldier?

Dear Sirs: I have been in the army about two months. During that time I have seen some fine movies on sex hygiene, first aid, military courtesy, and the art of war. In addition I have heard pep talks by and about our war heroes. The talks were filled with tales of bravery, humorous stories, and daring incidents guaranteed to thrill young America. At no time has anything been said on the subject of "Why America Is at War" or "What Are You Fighting for, Soldier?" No one has stimulated us to really conscientious efforts in training by discussing the facts in the case of Democracy vs. Fascism. The shadow of a fascist victory is far removed. The rich possibilities of a truly democratic world are never allowed to interfere with the day's routine of duty.

The men around me are a cross-section of America. They are farmers, factory workers, and white-collar men from every section of this country. They act in the army just as they did in civilian life—only they dress alike, march in formation, and follow military orders. Those who are naturally sincere and conscientious do their work sincerely and conscientiously as they did in civilian life. Those who took short cuts before they came into the army still take short cuts wherever they can.

At no time have I seen men put any real spirit into their training. No one is inspired to give that extra something which is the difference between man and man out to win a war. As individuals a surprising number have a clear understanding of the alternatives—victory or defeat. But they are politically uneducated, and their feelings find no channels for expression.

Never have I heard a group of men break into song. Gathering in the barracks, standing in line, marching along a road, are all occasions for spirited men to express their feelings in song. The fact that they do not is in itself evidence of the thing that is lacking. When the radio is turned on, it is a battle between popular music and news. That there is a battle shows that there is a group of men who care. Today it is popular music that wins. With the right kind of leadership news would win every time.

Army life without a belief in what a victorious army can achieve is stale and boring. Give these men an opportunity to express their real feelings and boredom would vanish. With this changed spirit, training would be faster and more thorough. Men would take the hardships with a different kind of complaining. They would compete for jobs, for knowledge, and for a chance to be of the most effective service.

Potentially we have a high-spirited army, an army that knows why it is fighting. Let's turn the potentiality into a reality by realistically discussing the kind of world we are fighting for.

PRIVATE S. K.

Repeal the Exclusion Act!

Dear Sirs: Yes, Mr. Fischer, India's trouble is America's business and the business of all of the United Nations, for it raises the whole question of what we are fighting for. "This is a people's war." Aren't we fighting for a "free world"? Are the people of India free? Have all the democracies proved their sincerity of purpose in fighting this costly war. Asia, as well as the rest of the world, has a right to expect proof.

The "Atlantic Charter," Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms," and Henry Wallace's famous speech expressed ideals in which we believe; we want India and China to share these ideals. Quoting President Woodrow Wilson, "We seek nothing for ourselves that we do not seek for all men."

Action on the part of Great Britain now would bring its reward, regardless of the dangers and difficulties involved. However, let the American people first take action at home. Our immigration laws should be revised at once to remove the present color stigma. The cause of democracy is suffering at the hands of our own country because the worthy Chinese are excluded from our shores. Surely nothing could do more to establish the confidence of the Chinese and Indians in the sincerity of American democracy than for the United States immigration laws to be changed at this time. The feeling against the white race in the Orient may be reversed if the American Congress, supported by the people, acts immediately to render this great service of simple justice.

Britain's handling of the India problem is not our direct responsibility. But a law which denies United States citizenship—even shore leave—to our allies is our case.

ROSA NOLTE

Los Angeles, Cal., August 29

Aliens and the War Effort

Dear Sirs: In this time of national emergency, when the dedication of our unity with the United Nations is so vital a part of our mutual war effort, a situation still exists which prevents the utilization of the brains and skill of thousands of persons who, having come from the conquered countries, are as devoted as we Americans are to the cause that fascism shall be eliminated from the earth. I refer to the position of the alien who finds that neither in the government nor out of it is he welcomed as an addition to our war effort.

It is true, of course, that when there are not enough jobs to go around a nation may be justified in offering employment only to citizens, but today there is a surplus not of workers but of work. And not just a surplus, a crying need. And still the Czech or Yugoslav who has declared his intention to become a citizen but who is not yet one because of time requirement is not accepted as a worker in the arsenal of the democracies, even though—if we insist on being technical—he is a member of one of the United Nations. America will perpetuate the name of martyred Lidice. How much more significant and realistic to permit the living symbols of Lidice who are in our midst to help produce the implements of vengeance!

Another reason advanced for the barring of aliens from employment in the defense industries is the fear that the loyalty of these people may still lie with the mother country. But even if we must suspect all nationals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, we are not justified in placing all aliens in the same position. If we are to withhold jobs from one group because we doubt that they have totally estranged themselves from their former loyalties to our enemies, how inconsistent to treat in a similar manner the much larger group who may still feel some kinship with our friends! With one stroke we weaken the morale of millions of loyal aliens and hinder our own war effort.

JACK GELFAND

Philadelphia, Pa., August 31

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED